26. Decision made on basis of Section. Once the decision made on the basis of Sections 30-A and 30-B has been confirmed by the Superintending Canal Officer, it cannot subsequently be disturbed.
Tek Chand v. State of Haryana, ILR (1968) 1 Punjab 692 = 1968 PLJ 47 = 1970 PLR 336.
27. Any other matter Clause (d) of Section 30-A (1) is wide enough to cover any other matter not specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30-A.
Piyare Lal v. State of Punjab, 1966-68 PLR Supp. 491 = 1966 Cur. LJ 3.
28. Non publication of sketch plan. Non-publication of sketch plain of area with scheme amounts to no proper scheme proposed.
Bhagwana v. Divisional Canal Officer, AIR 1970 Punjab 539 = 1969 PLJ 443.
29. Non-speaking order. Non-speaking order is liable to be set aside.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1969 PLJ 61.
30. Right to approve scheme. A Divisional Canal Officer can exercise the right to approve a scheme envisaged in Section 30-A, he has got to go through the procedure of inviting hearing and consideration of objections, etc.
Pirthi v. The Superintending Canal Officer, 1970 PLJ 566 = 1970 Cur. LJ 706.
31. Framing of draft scheme. Absurd to say that as soon as a person makes an application for preparing a scheme in respect of any of the matters detailed in sub-section (1) of Section 30-A, the Divisional Canal Officer is bound to frame a draft scheme notwithstanding the fact that the application and the suggestions made for the new scheme are not feasible on the face of it.
Lachman Singh v. Hem Singh, 1972 PLJ 557.
32. Re-allotment of entire area. The authorities under the Act have the jurisdiction to re-allot the entire area which was served by an existing water- course to a new water-course, thus leaving no land at all to be served by the previous water-course.
Kundan Lal v. The Divisional Canal Officer, ILR (1969) 2 Punjab 452 = 1968 PLJ 324 = 71 PLR 162.
33. Order providing for Pucca Naka. By the impugned order the superintending Canal Officer in any manner interfered with the order passed by the Divisional Canal Officer. He has not changed the water-course. He has only ordered for providing a Pucca Naka instead of Kaccha Naka at point F. For providing such a Naka, no scheme is to be prepared. Therefore, the order of the Superintending Canal Officer is perfectly within jurisdiction. It is clearly mentioned in the order of the Superintending Canal Officer that the order was passed on an agreement between the parties. The petitioner had filed review application against this order after some time. Even in that review application, copy of which has been attached as Annexure D to the writ petition, it was not stated that the petitioner had not agreed to the passing of this order. Since the order has been passed on an agreement between the parties, the petitioner cannot now challenge the same.
Havildar Khaili Ram v. Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle, Ferozepur and Anr., 1982 LLR 693 = 1981 PLJ 47 = 1981 RLR 87.
34. Order passed after receiving approval Effect. Though a number of grounds had been taken to quash the impugned orders, the one most striking approval from the Superintending Engineer (Superintending Canal Officer) and the Chief Engineer and thereby caused affectation to his quasi-judicial functions and further even before confirmation of the scheme at his end put into effect the warabandi. Learned counsel for the respondents when confronted with this situation have nothing to urge and all what is said is that the Divisional Canal Officer had only acted with pure motives, for the proposal mooted before him in the matter of the draft scheme was better to have been approved before hand before the Superintending Canal Officer to whom his order in any case was appealable. As it seems, this argument would not hold good. No officer on the original side, can seek approval of his proposed orders from the superior, appellate or revisional officer. Learned counsel for the respondents in this situation candidly concede that the impugned orders in both these matters need not sustain, and that the demand of Mithu Singh to have his area transferred to outlet RD 14828/RB Lal Bai Distributory, should be examined afresh by the Divisional Canal Officer, uninfluenced by any approval given to the proposal by the Superintending Canal Officer and the Chief Engineer. On this concession, the impugned orders Annexures P.2, P.3, P.3/A, P.5 and Annexure R. 1 are unshed, leaving it open to the Divisional Canal Officer to deal with the matter afresh, uninfluenced by the approvals of the superior officers, as mentioned earlier.
Tara Singh v. Mithu Singh, 1987 (2) LLR 29 = 1987 PLJ 116 = 1987 RLR 160.
35. Absence of party during measurements. The Superintending Canal Officer has only asked for the spot levels of the field falling in the way of an alternative water-course as also the level of the fields of Bhola Ram and Boga Ram which had to benefit from that water-course. It was a technical subject. Only measurements were to be taken by an Expert. The presence of the petitioners for that purpose was not necessary. Moreover, these measurements were been taken to provide relieve to them. These were not the measurements pertaining to the land falling under watercourse ABCD sanctioned by the Divisional Canal Officer. So the absence of the party when measurements were made which ultimately culminate in its favour cannot be termed to be prejudicial to that party. The order passed by the Superintending Canal Officer is very fair and just. A look at the site-plan makes manifest that the petitioners could not be provided more relief than has been done by the Superintending Canal Officer while providing means of irrigation to the respondent.
Bhajan Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1985 (2) LLR 496 = 1985 PLJ 372 = 1985(2) CLJ 322
36. Preparation of scheme. A scheme was prepared in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-A to 30-D, it had been properly published and notices had been issued to the affected right holders and in fact all the petitioners appeared before the Divisional Canal Officer and projected their view-points. Their presence has been marked. The contentions raised by them on various dates have also been noticed in this order. The Divisional Canal Officer had sanctioned water course ABCD after hearing the parties.
Bhajan Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1985 (2) LLR 496 = 1985 PLJ 372 = 1985 (2) CIJ 322.
37. Suo Motu Interference. Respondent No. 2 interfered suo moto after the application made by respondent No.3 had been dismissed without his being heard. As the language of Section 30-A shows, respondent No. 2 has the power on his own as well as on the application o fa shareholder to prepare a draft scheme to provide reallotment of an area served by one water-course to another. The order dated March 19, 1968 was passed by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 3 under this provision and not under Section 30-B of the Act. It was in the preparation of the scheme that respondent No.2 made provision for irrigation of the area of respondent No.3 from R.D. 4335-R instead of R.D. 3500-R. There cannot be any gainsaying the fact that it is the Divisional Canal Office5r, who is entitled to make a provision for a shareholder under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30-A of the Act. The order of respondent No.2 having been passed in course of and or the purpose of preparation of scheme, as contemplated by Section 30-A and forming part of the scheme, no exception could be taken to it and this suo moto action even after dismissal of the application of respondent No.3 for transfer of his area from R.D. 3530-R to R.D. 4335R fully called for. Respondent No.2 while considering objections called claimed to have been filed on behalf of the appellant under sub-section (1) of Section 30-B of the Act, approved of the scheme as settled under Section 30-A (1) (b) of the Act. The two main considerations, which have prevailed with the canal authorities in not disturbing the arrangement of transferring of transfer in favour of respondent No.3 made in the scheme, are that the area of respondent No.3, was prior to the transfer, being served from R.D. 4335-R and that it was in the interest of better irrigation that the area of respondent No.3 should be served from that R.D. If factual consideration of which the canal authorities are the best judges, have prevailed with them in transfer of area of a shareholder from one watercourse to another no interference with the facts found by them in favour of that shareholder could be made in writ proceedings.
Dassu v. The Superintending Canal Officer, Western Jumna Canal, West Circle, Rohtak, LLR (Vol. 9) Supplement 250 = AIR 1971 Punjab 482 = 1971 PLJ 489 = 1971 CLJ 763.
38. Assistance from subordinate staff. Where the Divisional Canal Officer takes assistance from the subordinate staff while framing a scheme there is no violation of any statutory provisions. Preliminary work for a preparation of a scheme under Section 30-A is always got done from the subordinate staff. It is on the basis of the date so collected that the scheme is finally sanctioned by the Divisional Canal Officer.
Jagjit Singh v. Punjab State Tubewell Corpn., 1988 (1) LLR 662 = 88 PLJ 271 = 1988 (1) PLR 278 = 1988 (1) PLR 476 = 1988 (1) CLJ 559.
30-B. Publication of a scheme. (1) Every scheme shall, as soon as may be after its preparation, be published in such form and manner as may be prescribed by rules made in this behalf inviting objections and suggestions with respect thereof within twenty-one days of the publication.
(2) The Divisional Canal Officer may after considering the objections and suggestions, if any, approve, modify or reject scheme.
(3) The Superintending Canal Officer may suo motu within a period of thirty days from the date of publication under Section 30-C, or on an application, by a person aggrieved by the approval, modification or rejection of the scheme, made within a like period, call for the record of the scheme from the Divisional Canal Officer and may, after examining the same, confirm the action taken by the Divisional Canal Officer or may, after affording to the person affected an opportunity of being heard, approve or modify the scheme in such form as he may deem fit or may reject the same.
1. Jurisdiction to review earlier order.
2. Conditions for exercising power of Revision.
3. Word modify.
4. Change of alignment
5. Revisory powers.
6. Appeal or revision before Chief Engineer.
7. Wrong assumption.
8. Quasi-judicial Tribunal.
9. Statutory remedy of appeal.
11. Publishing of Scheme.
12. Ex parte order.
13. Non-speaking order.
14. Exercise of powers under Article 226.
15. Arbitrary exercise of powers.
16. Cryptic and non-speaking order.
17. Scheme watercourse.
18. Colourable exercise of powers.
19. Non-speaking order.
20. Confirmation of order.
21. Functions as appellate officer.
22. Modification of Scheme.
23. Publication of rejected Scheme.
24. Limitation Publication of Scheme.
25. Hearing to be given.
26. New material Cannot be taken into consideration.
27. Revisional powers.
28. Splitting of outlet.
29. Revision Limitation.
30. Revision Competency of.
31. Power of revision.
32. Order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
33. Rejection of Scheme.
34. Report can be secured from subordinates.
35. Starting point of limitation.
36. Non-compliance of procedure.
37. Denial of opportunity.
38. Procedure prescribed for hearing appeals.
39. Powers under are not of limited type.
40. Powers of Quasi-judicial Tribunal.
41. Filing of application.
42. Modification of Scheme.
43. Quantum of Compensation payable.
1. Jurisdiction to review earlier order. It is true that the Superintending Canal Officer has no jurisdiction to review his earlier order. This principle will apply where the earlier order had been passed after hearing the parties. In the instant case, the earlier order was passed ex parte against the petitioners. The Superintendent Canal Officer had the jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order against the petitioners if he could come to the conclusion that the petitioners had good jurisdict on the being absent on the date fixed.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 PLJ 522.
2. Conditions for exercising power of Revision. The condition for exercising power of evasion on an application or suo motu under Se4ction 30-B(3) is with regard to the publication of an approved scheme. Therefore, neither in Section 30-C nor in Section 30-B (3) can the word approven be read to include the word disapproved. As a scheme disapproved or rejected cannot be published under Section 30-C there is no power of revision given by Section 30-B(3) to the Superintending Canal Officer against the disapproval or rejection of a draft scheme.
Jalaur Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer & Ors., 1981 LLR 40 = 80 RLR 473 = 1980 PLR 689 = 1980 CLJ 332.
3. Word modify In the present case, the Divisional Canal Officer neither approved nor rejected but notified the scheme. The question arises as to whether the change made by him can be called modification of the scheme. The word modify has not been defined in the Act. According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, the word modify means to make partial changes in. In the Websters Third New International dictionary, 1966 Edition, it has been defined, to make minor changes in the form of structure of. It is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meanings. Therefore, the word modify in the section means to make fractional or partial changes.
Gajjan Ram v. Divisional Canal Officer & Ors., 1982 LLR 10 = 1981 PLJ 487 = 81 PLR 738.
4. Change of alignment. The map annexed with the writ-petition shows that earlier the watercourse was provided along the alignment ABCD which goes from West to East. Now, it has been sanctioned along the alignment LMB which proceeds from North to South. Thus, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that there is a partial alteration in the alignment. The orders of the Divisional Canal and the Superintending Canal Officer are, therefore, liable to be set aside on this ground.
Gajjan Ram v. Divisional Canal Officer & Ors. 1982 LLR 10 = 1981 PLJ 487 = 81 PLR 738.
5. Revisory powers. The Legislature envisaged two situations in which the Superintending Canal Officer could exercise revisory powers. He could do so suo motu at any time and if he has to exercise such power on an application being made by any person aggrieved by the approved scheme, he can exercise the powers only within a period of thirty days from the date of the publication of the particulars of the scheme under Section 30-A.
Ajmer Singh & Ors v. The Superintending Canal Officer & Ors. 1979 LLR 126 = 1979 PLJ 221 = 79 PLR 359 = 79 CLJ 301.
6. Appeal for revision before Chief Engineer. No appeal or revision provided to the Chief Engineer against the order of the Superintending Engineer. The order of the Divisional Canal Officer will only be operative after it is confirmed by the Superintending engineer, and once there is an order of the Superintending Engineer, it becomes final.
Mehar Singh v. Dulla Singh, 64 PLR 648.
7. Wrong assumption. The proceedings recorded on the file of the Divisional Canal Officer show that the petitioner did make a statement that the drain which was sanctioned by the Divisional Canal Officer on December 3, 1975, and which was to run along with the southern boundary of 69/4/2, 4/1 and 5, and whose breadth was to be to the extent of one Karam is quite all right. He further prayed that this drain be approved and except it on other drain will be able to irrigate his land. In the face of this statement, the Superintending Canal Officer wrongly assumed that the petitioner made no demand for the sanction of water-course through the fields of the respondents.
Sarwan Singh v. Rattan Singh Chaudhar and Ors. 1979 LLR 522.
8. Quasi-judicial Tribunal. No provision in the Act allowing the power of review to the S.C.O. as while passing the earlier order, he acted as a Quasi-Judicial Tribunal.
Nathu v. Chief Canal Officer & Ors., 1989 (1) LJR 9 = 1989(1) LLR 398 = 1988 (2) LLR 375.
9. Statutory remedy of appeal. The natural corollary of a valid sanction of the scheme is that a statutory remedy of appeal is provided against it under Section 30-B (3) of the Act before the Superintending Canal Officer. The petitioners have admittedly not availed of this remedy. They, therefore, cannot maintain the present writ petition in the Court.
Jagtjit Singh v. Punjab State Tubewell Corpn. 1988 (1) LLR 662 = 88 PLJ 271 = 88 (1) RLR 278 = 88 (1) PLR 476 = 88 (1) CLJ 559.
10. Limitations. The starting point of the period of 30 days limitation under sub-section (3) of Section 30-B is the date of the publication of the scheme.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1969 PLJ 61.
11. Publishing of scheme. In order to bind all the right holders, it is necessary that the scheme as a whole have been published.
Smt. Parkash Kaur v. The State, 1969 PLJ 401.
12. Review. Superintending Canal Officer has power to review.
Nath v. Bhagwana, 1975 PLJ 2000.
13. Ex-part order. The petitioners did not have the opportunity of hearing and the order was passed ex parte. The same being non est and nullity has to be set aside.
Gurmit Singh v. Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle, 1981 LLR 697.
14. Non-speaking order. The Superintending Canal Officer did not advert t the grounds raised in the revision petition and passed an order which is non-speaking and perfunctory. In this situation, no other alternative but to set aside the impugned order.
Sadhu Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 1982 LLR 694 = 1981 PLJ 397.
15. Exercise of powers under Art 226. Court does not, in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, substitute its own views on merits of the case in a matter which is within the sole discretion of authorities named under the Act. This is the main plank of the respondents on which they bank upon. But on the other hand it cannot be disputed that the Legislature, in its wisdom, conferred on the canal authorities the power to decide matters within their domain not only legally and correctly to the best of their judgment but with the confidence that the power would be exercised fairly and justly. And once that confidence appears to be abused under the colourable exercise of powers conferred under the statue. High Court is there to correct the authority by bringing its decision in conformity with law, justice and fairness.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1981 PLJ 483.
15. Arbitrary exercise of powers. The ostensible reasons put forward by the official respondents that the change was effected to promote the irrigation beats hollow when the land of respondent No. 5 received undisputable total irrigation facilities even through the old water course and the position would not improve for respondent NO. 4 as his irrigation depended and would not improve for respondent No.4 as his irrigation depended and would remain dependent on the level and position at focal point F. The impugned orders appear to have been passed for considerations other than to promote irrigation and thus in arbitrary exercise of the powers conferred. The impugned orders cannot sustain in this law.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 LLR 699.
16. Cryptic and non-speaking order. Wether from the point of view of the petitioners or that of the respondents, the appellate order is and remains cryptic and non-speaking. As a quasi-judicial authority, the Superintending Canal Officer is required to pass an intelligible and speaking order, so that it can stand scrutiny of the High Court, if challenged, under Article 226 of the Construction. Thus the order in the present form is unsustainable.
Panchi v. SCB, 1982 SLR 239.
17. Scheme watercourse. The Divisional Canal Officer expressed his helplessness in his order dated September 4, 1974, for the restoration of this watercourse because it was not a scheme watercourse and could not be restored under Section 30-FF of the Act. The Superintending Canal Officer based his findings on a wrong premises that the petitioner has been getting irrigation from the watercourse provided by his brother Mukand Singh meaning thereby that he could continue with the same arrangement.
Sarwan Singh v. Rattan Singh, 1982 LLR 695.
18. Colourable exercise of powers. High Court does not, in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, substitute its own views on merits of the case in a matter which is within the sole discretion of authorities named under the Act. This is the main plank of the respondents on which they bank upon. But on the other hand it cannot be disputed that the Legislature, in its wisdom, conferred on the canal authorities the power to decide matters within their domain not only legally and correctly to the best of their judgement but with the confidence that the power would be exercised fairly and justly. And once that confidence appears to be abused under the colorable exercise of powers conferred under the statute, High Court is there to correct the authority by bringing its decision in conformity with law, justice and fairness.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 LLR 699.
19. Non-speaking order. The order o the Superintending Canal Officer Ferozepore, is under challenge. The order reads as under:-
The appeal of the appellant is accepted and the decision of the D.C.O. Abohar Division in canceling the alignment of w/c (watercourse) AE and approving the new alignment ACDE is rejected.
The order is obviously not a speaking order and, therefore, has to be quashed.
Hari Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1982 LLR 695 (1).
20. Confirmation or order. Under the Act the Superintending Canal Officer has no power to review his earlier order. Admittedly, the Superintending Canal Officer had confirmed the order of the Divisional Canal Officer vide his order Annexure P-4. Thus the subsequent order of the Superintending Canal Officer Annexure P-5 amounts to review, which on the face of it is illegal and without jurisdiction.
Sube Singh and others v. The Superintending engineer, 1983 (2) LLR 362 = 1983 PLJ 351.
21. Functions as appellate officer. The Superintending Canal Officer could not abandon his function as an appellate officer to decide the case on merits. And in doing so, he had to keep in mind that considerable expense had been undertaken by the petitioners though, according to him, partially forwards lining of the watercourse. The impugned order has left them in lurch and expense has gone down the drain with no advantage. Thus, it seems that the Superintending Canal Officer did not apply his mind, much less judicial minds, to the merits of the controversy, Necessarily, his order has to be set aside requiring him to reconsider the matter afresh.
Gulab Singh and others v. Superintending Canal Officer, 1983 (1) LLR 414 = 1983 PLJ 61.
22. Modification of Scheme. It is apparent from the order of the Divisional Canal Officer that he had sanctioned the existing water-course CDEF for the land of Maghar Singh, respondent. He had further ordered that this water shall remain on the spot as it is. He, however, rejected the scheme regarding watercourse XYZOF. It seems that the use of word rejected at the end of this passage is rather unhappy. The Divisional Canal Officer had in fact modified the scheme. Water-course ACDEF (or CDEF as it is mentioned at certain places of the order) was not a sanctioned water course. It was passing through the fields of Budh Singh bifurcating them. It was for his personal use It is another matter that Maghar Singh was allowed to use it but the latter had no right to do so. But, the Divisional Canal Officer sanctioned this water-course and conferred rights on Maghar Singh to use the same. This order tantamount to modifying the scheme. There is no dispute that this order adversely affected the rights of Budh Singh and he is thus a person aggrieved, as envisaged by section 30-B of the Act. So, a revision was competent against this order.
Jagrup Singh v. Superintending Canal Officer, Patiala Circle, 1983 (2) LLR 423 = 1983 PLJ 577.
23. Publication of rejected Scheme. Contention of counsel for the petitioner that while the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 30-B of the Act no doubt provided for an appeal to the Superintending Canal Officer, this right conferred upon the petitioner was not one which would be exercised as the period prescribed for the filling of such an appeal was 30 days from the date of the publication or the rejection of the scheme under Section 30-C of the Act. The argument being that as there was no provision in Section 30-C of the Act for the publication of the scheme which had been rejected under Section 30-B of the Act. No appeal could be filed. A reference to the relevant provision of the Act as it now stands would show that the proviso to Section 30-C of the Act which was incorporated in the Act much earlier than the orders passed in the case, clearly provides for the publication of even a rejected scheme. No ground thus survives to question the maintainability of the appeal or the jurisdiction of the Superintending Canal Officer to deal with it.
Shri Basant Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer and Ors. 1983 (2) LLR 284.
24. Limitation Publication of scheme. The order of the Divisional Canal Officer, Annexure P.1 is impugned primarily on the ground that it has not been passed within the stipulated period of 30 days from the receipt of the objections as envisaged by section 30-B (2). It is not in dispute that this impugned order of the Divisional Canal Officer in revision vide order Annexure P.2. It is again not in dispute that this point was not raised before either of there two officers and therefore they had no opportunity to comment on this aspect of the matter. Further, the High court finds that no factual basis has been laid down for raising this contention either in the petition or in the impugned orders as there is no mentioned of the date on which the objections were filed by the land owners in response to the publication of the scheme. It is only that date which could be the starting point of limitation for counting 30 days within which the impugned order was to be passed.
Tek Ram v. Superintending Canal Officer, Bhiwani, 1983 (1) LLR 659.
25. Hearing to be given. The appellant has to be heard and then his objection raised in the appeal are to be decided by giving reasons and then the appeal is either to be allowed or disallowed. The Superintending Engineer has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner without hearing him. Accordingly, the impugned orders are quashed and it is directed that the Superintending Engineer shall re-decide the appeal of the petitioner after hearing him. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
Bachan Singh v. Superintending Engineer, Punjab Tubewell Circle & Ors., 1983 (1) LLR 81 = 82 PLJ 370.
26. New material cannot be taken into consideration. The Superintending Canal Officer had no jurisdiction to take into consideration any new material.
Hukam Chand v. The Superintending Canal Officer, 1966-68 PLR Supp. 546.
27. Revisional power. The Superintending Canal Officer has only revisional power and that also he will exercise after hearing the person affected by the revision of the scheme.
Nand Lal v. Ballu, 1967 Cur. LJ 554.
28. Spliting of outlet. Superintending Canal Officer cannot split up outlet into two.
Chanchal Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1970 PLJ 467 = 1970 Cur LJ 535.
29. Revision Limitation. Period of 30 days within which an aggrieved party has no approach the Superintending Canal Officer in revision, starts from the date of the publication of the scheme under Section 30-C.
Bhola Ram v. The Superintending Officer, Western Jammu Canal, West Circle, Rohtak, 1970 PLJ 746.
30. Revision Competency of. Revision against scheme disapproved or rejected does not lie.
Lachman Singh singh v. Hem Singh, 1972 PLJ 557.
31. Power of revision. Superintending Canal Officer has power to revise an order passed by the Divisional Canal Officer within 30 days.
Bakshish Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer, Amritsar, 1975 PLJ 99.
32. Order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. If the Superintending Canal Officer is in full agreement with the reasons recorded by the Divisional Officer and upholds the laters order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, it may not be necessary for his always to reiterate or set down those reasons but his order must atleast indicate that he had adopted the reasoning of the subordinate authority.
Tehal Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur AIR 1969 Punjab 1 = 1968 cur. LJ 770.
33. Rejection of scheme. Rejection of a scheme in toto cannot be said to be a scheme which has been approved by the Divisional Canal Officer, Consequently the power of interference by Superintending Canal Officer does not exist.
Ram Rikh v. State of Haryana, 1968 Cur LJ 356 = ILR (1968) 2 Punjab 416=70 PLR 886.
34. Report can be secured from subordinate. Superintending Canal Officer can secure reports from the subordinates.
Dongar Ram v. Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle, 1971 PLJ 544 = See also 70 PLJ 375.
35. Starting point of limitation. Limitation for revision under section 30-B starts from the date of the publication of the approved scheme for implementation under Section 30-C.
Ranjit Singh v. Superintending (Engineer) Canal Officer, Patiala Circle, I.B. Patiala, 1973 PLJ 719.
36. Non-compliance of procedure. In view of non-compliance of procedure prescribed by Section 30-B to 30-D of the Act, the size of the outlet cannot be reduced.
Kishan Singh v. The State of Punjab, ILR (1965) 1 Punjab 564 = 67 PLR 212.
37. Denial of opportunity. The denial of opportunity at the initial stage cannot be cured by an opportunity of being heard afforded at a latter or higher stage.
Bhagwana v. The Divisional Canal Officer, AIR 1970 Punjab 539 = 1969 PLJ 343.
38. Procedure prescribed for hearing appeals. The Superintending Canal Officer exercises Judicial or at least quasi-judicial powers. The procedure prescribed for hearing the appeals and revision under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder approximate to that which an appellate or revisional court has to follow.
Tehal Singh v. Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur, AIR 1969 Punjab 1 = 1968 Cur. LJ 770.
39. Powers under are not of limited type. The powers under sub-section (3) of Section 30-B of the Act are not a limited type like those which given under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 30-B of the Act places no restriction on the Superintending Canal Officer that before taking a decision whether he would amend the scheme sanctioned by the Divisional Canal Officer, he cannot take into any information that may be available to him from the departmental record or even otherwise unless it can be reasonably established that the information was such that it was known to the other party and that the other party was not given an opportunity to meet that evidence.
The Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur, Canal Circle, Canal Colony, Ferozepur v. Hukam Chand, AIR 1972 Punjab 60 = 1971 PJ 450 = 1974 PLR 259 = 1971 Cur. LJ 732.
40. Powers of Quasi-judicial Tribunal. Superintending Canal Officer exercises powers of Quasi-judicial Tribunal.
Tehal Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle, Ferozepur, AIR 1969 Punjab 1 = 1966-68 PLR Supp.340.
41. Filling of application. A person can wait and file an application under Section 30-C of the Act after the actual publication of the particulars of the scheme had been made.
Gobind Singh v. Superintending Canal Officer, Patiala 1969 PLJ 45.
42. Modification of scheme. Sub Section (3) of Section 30-B of the Act expressly requires that the Superintending Canal Officer, after affording to the person affected and opportunity of being heard, could modify the scheme or the order as the case may be. It is the grievance of the petitioner that he had not been heard by the Superintending Canal Officer. He was not even a party before him because he was not a party before the Divisional Canal Officer. The records have been seen which showed that service had been effected upon the petitioner. It is unthinkable that despite having come to know that the Superintending Canal Officer wanted to deal with the matter which could after the petitioner adversely, yet the petitioner would not have cared to present himself personally or through a counsel to which his interest. The High Court, therefore, holds the impugned order to be void ab initio on account of the S.C.O. having not afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and set aside the same.
Ghukkar Singh v. Superintending Canal Officer, 1982 PLJ 299.
43. Quantum of compensation payable. Superintending Canal Officer cannot change the quantum of compensation payable.
Bachan Singh v. The Superintending Canal Officer, 1973 PLJ 47.